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Abstract 
 
Key to Myanmar’s current reform is the shift towards people-centered development. In wake of this 
trend, I/NGOs are localizing their projects through autonomous village organizations. This research 
appraises the motivations leading to the proliferation and effect of such VOs in Myanmar. Data was 
gathered through desk review, surveys, FGDs and interviews. Sample for this study was drawn from 
development projects funded by Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund in Myanmar. The 
findings and conclusions suggest: motivation of I/NGOs for creating VOs are reactive and 
opportunistic; VOs are established in response to the government’s development strategy and 
gradual opening of development space in Myanmar. VOs also manifest national mood of economic 
liberalization, and I/NGO’s unwavering faith on market as the solution to poverty reduction. I/NGOs 
are setting up VOs for instrumental ends, as channels to implement projects efficiently. Most of the 
VOs have created a boundary spanning role, working with decision makers at the grassroots to 
make services work with and for local people. Similarly, power over development works are being 
shared amongst different VOs and given rise to plurality of development actors and increased social 
capital at the village level. However, interference from village authorities and influential leaders 
over VOs appear to be a pertinent challenge facing all villages. As the findings suggest VOs are also 
frequented by micro-management from host I/NGOs to larger extent.  
 
Key words: Village organizations, participatory development, social capital, Livelihoods and Food 
Security Trust Fund, Myanmar 
 
(Word count: 14,847) 
 
  
 
 
3 
Table of Contents 
 
1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 7 
1.1 Purpose of the research ..................................................................................................................................... 7 
1.2 Disposition .............................................................................................................................................................. 8 
2 Myanmar: Country at glance ..................................................................................................................... 8 
2.1 Development context .......................................................................................................................................... 9 
2.2 International access to Myanmar ................................................................................................................ 10 
2.3 Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund.............................................................................................. 11 
2.4 Shift towards public participation .............................................................................................................. 11 
3 Methodology ................................................................................................................................................ 12 
3.1 Data Collection .................................................................................................................................................... 13 
3.1.1 Desk review ................................................................................................................................................. 13 
3.1.2 Sampling ....................................................................................................................................................... 13 
3.1.3 Survey ............................................................................................................................................................ 14 
3.1.4 Focus group discussion .......................................................................................................................... 14 
3.1.5 Semi-structured interviews ................................................................................................................. 14 
3.2 Analysis of data ................................................................................................................................................... 15 
3.3 Ethical considerations ...................................................................................................................................... 15 
3.4 Limitations of the study ................................................................................................................................... 15 
4 Conceptual basis......................................................................................................................................... 16 
4.1 The emergence of participation ................................................................................................................... 16 
4.2 The new ‘Holy Grail’ .......................................................................................................................................... 17 
4.3 Village organization- participation in practice ...................................................................................... 18 
4.3.1 Social Capital .............................................................................................................................................. 19 
4.3.2 Powerful Processes .................................................................................................................................. 20 
5 Findings and Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 21 
5.1 Organizations in spotlight .............................................................................................................................. 22 
5.1.1 Helpage International ............................................................................................................................. 23 
5.1.2 Thadar Consortium .................................................................................................................................. 23 
5.1.3 Proximity Design....................................................................................................................................... 24 
5.1.4 Pact ................................................................................................................................................................. 25 
5.1.5 Myanmar Ceramic Society .................................................................................................................... 25 
 
 
4 
5.1.6 Metta Development Foundation ......................................................................................................... 26 
5.2 Why form new village organizations? ....................................................................................................... 27 
5.2.1 Political renewal ....................................................................................................................................... 27 
5.2.2 Getting rid of the ‘obsolete’ .................................................................................................................. 28 
5.2.3 In market we trust .................................................................................................................................... 29 
5.2.4 Small and medium enterprise development ................................................................................. 31 
5.2.5 Response to cyclone Nargis .................................................................................................................. 32 
5.2.6 Overarching motivations: instrumental vs. empowerment .................................................... 32 
5.3 What has been the effect of mobilizing village organizations? ....................................................... 34 
5.3.1 Participatory development and democratic governance ......................................................... 34 
5.3.2 Digging deeper into reality- whose voice? ..................................................................................... 35 
5.3.3 Space for the vulnerable and voiceless ............................................................................................ 37 
5.3.4 Increased social capital .......................................................................................................................... 38 
5.3.5 VO overlap and membership cross overs ....................................................................................... 40 
6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................... 41 
6.1 Why village organizations? ............................................................................................................................ 41 
6.2 What has been the effect? ............................................................................................................................... 42 
7 List of reference .......................................................................................................................................... 44 
8 Appendices ................................................................................................................................................... 49 
8.1 Appendix- I: List of participants (FGDs and Interviews) ................................................................... 49 
8.2 Appendix-II: Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund ................................................................... 50 
 
Abbreviations 
ADB     Asian Development Bank 
CBO     Community Based Organization 
CfW     Cash for Work 
EC     European Commission 
FFS     Farmer Field School 
FGD     Focus Group Discussion 
HI     Helpage International 
ICAP     Integrated Community Action Plan 
 
 
5 
IFAD     International Fund for Agriculture Development 
IHLA     Integrated Household and Living Assessment 
I/NGO     International/Non-Governmental Organization 
LIFT     Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund 
MCS     Myanmar Ceramic Society 
MDG     Millennium Development Goal  
MFC     Micro Finance Center 
PNO     Pa O National Organization 
PRA     Participatory Rural Appraisal 
SHG     Self Help Group 
SRG     Self Reliance Group 
TC     Thadar Consortium 
UNDP     United Nations Development Programme 
UNOPS     United Nations Office for Project Services 
USD     United States Dollar 
VA     Village Administrator 
VAC     Village Administration Council  
VDC     Village Development Committee 
VERP     Village Elders and Respected Persons 
VMC     Village Management Committee  
VSLA     Village Savings and Loan Association 
VTA     Village Tract Administration 
VO     Village (based) Organization 
WB     World Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
Acknowledgement 
Putting together this research has been a great expedition in itself- a travel across climates, 
countries and cultures. It had its own highs and lows, peak motivations and frustrations, but like 
any journey it has led to an inner fulfilment and re-discovering my passion for this profession we 
call ‘development’. Thanks to all my travel companions, my new found friends and work colleagues 
who have made this journey less grueling and more exhilaration.  
It was an honor and privilege to have worked in Myanmar at such an interesting time in its history. 
I will be forever grateful to UNOPS, in particular Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund, for 
giving me this opportunity to scale my individual path and undertake this research study. Words 
won’t suffice to explain my gratitude to two wonderful supervisors at UNOPS, Yasmin Padamsee- 
who let me flow with my intuitions and George Collett, who had strong faith in this study topic. 
Special thanks to you both for giving me the autonomy to work outside my regular job. I have been 
also fortunate to work with all other LIFT colleagues, and collaborate with some incredibly talented 
peers and mentors. While there are many wonderful people to thank, my big chei-zu tin-bar-te to 
Aung Aung Kyaw- without your support and translations, this research would have never 
materialized. The respondents, from all participating international and local NGOs, I thank for their 
openness and candid conversations.  
And now back to my home institution- thanks Karin Karlsson, my fellow Lumider in Yangon, for 
being a life support! You are a great motivating force, a true nurturer. Brittany Bensson, you also 
deserve a special gratitude- had it not been for your remainders of academic deadlines, this report 
would be, technically, overdue. Thank you also to my peer reviewer- Daniel Wallinder and thesis 
supervisor, Catia Gregoratti for their constructive criticisms. 
Last but not the least, tack på Svenska Institutet for making this master studies at LU possible. Your 
scholarship has enabled my access to places and institutions, which otherwise were beyond my 
reach!   You have made a dream come true!  
 
Suedip Joshi 
 
 
7 
1 Introduction 
The ongoing political-economic transition in Myanmar is opening up decision making about 
country’s development, in particular reflecting local situations and public opinions. Key to the 
government’s reform is the shift towards people-centered development and public participation at 
the grassroots. Involving rural villages and communities in decisions that shape their lives is central 
to making development more effective, and it has the potential to transform the role that poor 
people play by giving them voice and agency (Nishino & Koehler, 2012, p. 7). In wake of this trend, 
development organizations in Myanmar are widely localizing their projects through a self-
governing beneficiary organization at the village level, called village organization. But, the potential 
benefit of such organization depends very much on the specific approach and design.  
Most practitioners would acknowledge that mobilizing autonomous VOs and injecting democratic 
decision-making at the grassroots is useful for Myanmar’s transition. Not least because a number of 
studies have concluded that current project practices suffer from several shortcomings. A World 
Bank study, for instance, raised concern about duplication of INGO funded VOs and need to address 
the problem of aid fragmentation at the village level (WB, 2012). In addition, Myanmar’s abrupt 
shift from an autarchic, command based paradigm to a bottom-up development approach creates 
considerable conceptual and practical challenges for mobilizing such autonomous organizations. 
Finding ways to strengthen VOs, while taking into consideration the differing approaches of 
implementing I/NGOs, their relationship with the local authorities, and legacy of half a decade 
military rule and of the people living in these villages is therefore a challenging task.  
Only a relative handful of studies have specifically examined about VOs in Myanmar; e.g. one of the 
first studies to explore the nature of village level governance was conducted by Susanne Kempel, a 
UNDP consultant in 2012 (Kempel, 2012). Whether the motivation of and why I/NGOs are setting 
up VOs has a direct effect on participation and access to decision making of project beneficiaries, 
however, remains an open question. The scarcity of information about VOs in Myanmar is 
regrettable because it is the sort of evidence the government, donors and I/NGOs appear to be 
requiring if they are to support people centered, bottom-up development.  
1.1 Purpose of the research  
This research critically appraises the way in which VO is currently understood and practiced by 
International/Non-Government Organizations (I/NGOs) in Myanmar and the effect mobilizing these 
village organizations have on Myanmar’s development; but also to highlight prospects for 
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improving current practices. This research attempts to inform development actors and policy 
makers on some of the definitional issue surrounding the concept of VOs, before moving on to 
explore some of the driving factors in the phenomenon, and different approaches and types of 
support provided to the VOs.  
In particular, this research examines two key questions:  
 Why are village organizations proliferating in Myanmar’s development projects1? 
 What has been the effect of mobilizing these village organizations for Myanmar’s 
development?  
1.2 Disposition  
Following to this introduction chapter, consists a background chapter describing Myanmar’s 
historical and contemporary issues surrounding political and economic reforms, development 
context and overview about Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT). Chapter three 
describes the methodologies and thorough data acquisition processes undertaken for this study. It 
also sheds light on the sampling design, analysis of data and limitations faced during the study. The 
conceptual basis surrounding the research topic is offered in chapter four, which also serves as the 
analytical framework for answering the research questions. In particular, chapter 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 
entails discussions on the emergence of participatory development, and village organizations as the 
interface of participation in development projects. Meanwhile, subchapters 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 describe 
the intricacies and potential effects VOs have over social capital and power dynamics of the target 
villages and on development in general. Findings of this research are reported in chapter five as two 
overarching domains: (a) why form new village organizations, (b) what has been the effect of 
mobilizing village organizations? This is however preceded with a brief introduction to the sample 
respondents, 3 NGOS and 3 INGOs, and the type of village organization they mobilized. Chapter six 
offers conclusion against the research questions, and thereafter references and appendices follow. 
2 Myanmar: Country at glance 
Myanmar (historically called Burma) is the largest country in Southeast Asia with a total land area 
of 676,577 sq. kilometers (ADB, 2012). The country has an estimated population of 59.1 million, 
consisting of diverse ethnic groups speaking over 100 languages and dialects (UNDP, 2012a). The 
country is administratively divided into seven states in the upland/hilly areas and seven regions, 
                                                          
1 This particularly relates to projects implemented after Myanmar’s political reforms and funded through LIFT grants.  
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which cover mostly the lowland or plain areas. The regions, also called divisions- Ayeyarwady 
(Delta), Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and Yangon- are populated predominantly 
by Bamar, the dominant ethnic group 
that is 68 percent (IHLA, 2011) of the 
population. Meanwhile, the states- Chin, 
Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine and 
Shan- in quintessence are regions, 
which are largely populated by ethnic 
minorities.  
The administrative divisions are further 
subdivided into townships, village 
tracts, and villages.  
Within the states in upland areas, there 
are ethnic-based struggles for self-
autonomy and independence. Ethnically 
a diverse country, Myanmar’s modern 
history has been ravaged by ethnic and 
sectarian conflicts, which still continue 
in some of the states like Kachin (ADB, 
2012).  
2.1 Development context 
Myanmar is the poorest countries in 
Southeast Asia; the country ranked 149 
out of 187 countries in recent human 
development index and poverty levels 
are currently high, at an estimated 26 percent of the population (UNDP 2012a). Absolute poverty is 
twice as high in rural areas than urban, higher in upland areas than plains and highest of all 
amongst the ethnic minorities (ADB 2012, p.2). Also, disparities in food security and other forms of 
wellbeing- including employment, access to education and health care, gender equality- are evident 
across regions, states and ethnic groups (ibid). 
Figure 1: Administrative map of Myanmar (Utexas, 2012) 
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Agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, with almost 70 percent of the labor force engaged in 
farming (IHLA, 2011). This, however, only accounts for 36% of gross domestic product and food 
insecurity is a major development challenge for the country (ibid). The contribution of rural 
enterprises and agriculture to economic growth, job creation and poverty reduction is also limited. 
Largely organized on a small scale without significant access services, development support or 
effective market linkages, people’s livelihoods are structurally precarious, operating on low input, 
low return household economies.   
2.2 International access to Myanmar 
Until recently, Myanmar was almost a closed country, detached from progress elsewhere; its people 
living through grinding poverty under 50 years of successive military dictatorships. Popular 
revolutions were crushed by violent crackdowns in 1989 and 2007 consecutively (Nishino & 
Koehler, 2012), press was restrained, civil organizing was banned and development was centrally 
managed by the military regime (Irin, 2012). The country was controlled to an extent where even 
village chiefs were handpicked by the junta (ibid). International sanction was placed against 
Myanmar, which intended to punish the country’s military junta for human right violations, but also 
constrained the levels of foreign aid (Saha, 2011, p. 7). Myanmar received such low aid that it used 
to be called “aid orphan” between 1990 and 2007; official development assistance per capita was 
less than 5 USD annually, the lowest for any developing country (ibid).  
After decades of authoritarian regime, and being shut out of aid money because of it, Myanmar is 
starting to see a shift in donor attitudes after the recent political reforms. Over the last year, the 
military junta presided over elections. Since then, the new civilian government has freed political 
prisoners and permitted a modicum of political participation by opposition groups (Philips, 2012).  
Today, Myanmar is undergoing three major transitions; from an authoritarian rule to democratic 
governance, autarchic economy to a market-based modality, and from 60 years of internal conflict 
to national reconciliation and peace (ADB 2012, p. 4). Key to this government’s reform is the role of 
citizen participation. New laws and policies, such as Myanmar’s Rural Development Framework, are 
being enacted with a people centered approach. As the government of Myanmar continues to 
pledge political reform, it has led to increased donor’s confidence and exponential growth of aid 
flow in a country that has historically received among the lowest per capita development aid of any 
developing country (Saha 2011, p. 4-7). 
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2.3 Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund  
In response to the Burmese government’s call for assistance after Cyclone Nargis2, the Livelihoods 
and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) was set up in 2009 as a multi donor fund to support Myanmar 
make faster progress towards the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, one of the MDGs 
(LIFT, 2012a, p. 6). Donors include the governments of Australia, Denmark, the European 
Commission, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America. The donors contracted 
United Nations Office for Project Services as the 
Fund Manager to administer the funds and provide 
monitoring and oversight of the financial and 
technical performance of the grantees. To date, 
LIFT has been the main aid instrument for rural 
development in Myanmar and collectively the 
donors have provided US$ 176 million and reached 
two million rural poor (Kobia, 2013). In doing so, 
LIFT has provided grants to 32 implementing 
partners: 21 INGO, 7 local organizations, and 4 UN 
agencies (LIFT, 2012a, p. 6). LIFT’s first grants in 
2010 funded projects in the Delta, which assisted 
the cyclone-affected population. Between 2011 and 
2013, LIFT has expanded its funding countrywide 
over the Dry Zone (Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay and 
Bago regions) in the lowlands, as well as Shan, Chin, Kachin and Rakhine State.  
2.4 Shift towards public participation 
Two central reasons dictate the need for scholarly attention to village organizations in Myanmar. 
The first comes from series of empirical evidence. In Myanmar, 2/3rd of the population live in 
villages and it is where poverty is concentrated (Kempel, 2012). The second reason that the topic is 
worthy is that the current government prioritizes villages as the key entry points for development 
                                                          
2
 In the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 - a disaster that left over 140,000 people dead 
and affected 2.4 million through the Ayeyarwady Delta - international aid workers were initially prevented 
from working in affected areas. Only a week after the crisis, faced with insufficient resource to carry relief 
work and growing international condemnation for barring international support, the Burmese government 
finally opened up space for aid workers and also requested official assistance to the UN (Maung, 2012).    
Figure 2: LIFT's geographical coverage 
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and sees it as engines of economic growth and poverty reduction (Myint, 2013, p. 3). The concept of 
VO is, therefore, becoming integral to the socio-economic development of Myanmar. All of these 
observations highlight the fundamental importance to focus on villages and local communities and 
understanding institutions that shape people’s lives and decision making at the rural level.  
With the ushering government reforms, I/NGOs now have more space and opportunity to operate 
in the villages. Almost all the I/NGO projects currently have an increasing stress on the social 
mobilization and participatory governance aspects of their target beneficiaries. The World Bank 
(WB, 2012, p. 59) found that of all 40 villages included in its research, aid projects delivered 
assistance primarily through village based organizational set up. Of 247 different schemes reported 
in the study, only 9% of projects handed aid directly to beneficiaries without any village based 
organization. In LIFT funded projects alone, 30 I/NGOs reported having supported a total of 7200 
VOs in the last three years (LIFT, 2012a). These VOs vary by type and include from village 
development committees representing the entire village to smaller livelihood committees and self-
help groups formed around specific project activities. The configuration and function of these VOs 
also differ significantly. Some development projects are using VOs as a channel to disburse aid and 
deliver project services to their target beneficiaries, while others actually employ these 
organizations to help villages identify their problems, enact action plans and implement activities 
based on their collectively agreed priorities.  
3 Methodology  
Because this inquiry about VOs concern unobservable conditions as much as observable events, it 
requires a philosophy of science that presumes a stratified understanding of social reality as well as 
the possibility of discovering it (Hattori, 2001, p. 637). Accordingly, I have adopted a pragmatic 
worldview (Creswell, 2012), which assumes reality as a set of layered relations and is therefore 
ontologically deep. As a result, this study was conducted as a mixed design, which tackles and 
unpacks these layers of social relation through iterative processes of abstraction and inductive 
reasoning (Creswell 2009: 10). Since my approach to the relationship between theories and 
research is primarily inductive, this study involves drawing generalizable inferences out of 
observations and collected data (Bryman, 2008, p. 15). I am using theories at the very least and as a 
foreground to my qualitative investigations.  
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3.1 Data Collection  
Data for this study was collected from October 2013 to March 2014. Information for this study 
associated both quantitative and qualitative forms and triangulated through various methods and 
at different levels of development interventions, government, donors, stakeholders, implementing 
organizations and beneficiaries, hence increasing the reliability of the findings. Data was collected 
through multiple sources to include an extensive desk review, followed by a detailed survey 
questionnaire,   focus group discussions and semi structured interviews.  
3.1.1 Desk review 
The aim of desk review was to collect factual information, theoretical discussions, lessons gathered 
and good practices and baseline for arguments surrounding VOs. Relevant secondary data was 
gathered during July- December, 2013 from an extensive desk review of government legislations, 
donor strategies and guidelines, LIFT internal monitoring reports and case studies, project reports 
and research publications of I/NGOs, information on the internet, news articles and policy briefs 
surrounding Myanmar’s rural development. Further data was drawn from UNDP’s recent study on 
village level governance, i.e (Kempel, 2012) and the proceedings from Myanmar’s first ever national 
workshop3 on rural development. Data gathered from the desk review was used to create a 
conceptual basis for the study, develop research questions and detailed questionnaires for next 
stage of primary data acquisition (Bryman, 2008). Literature reviewed during this stage has also 
influenced the reporting of findings and drawing conclusion on the research topic.  
3.1.2 Sampling  
The sample for this study was drawn out from the I/NGOs implementing LIFT funded projects. 
Because LIFT is a harmonized multi-donor fund for rural development and has a countrywide 
geographical coverage, a well-designed sample of its grantee I/NGOs represents the VO experience 
of development agencies in Myanmar. Sample of I/NGOs was drawn out from a sequential 
approach. In a sequential approach, sampling from the first phase or strand informs the second 
phase (Creswell, 2009, p. 183). In the first phase, all 32 LIFT funded I/NGOs were surveyed through 
a self-completion questionnaire. Their answers were analyzed, which later informed the choice for 
a representative sample in the second phase of data collection. Six organizations, 3 NGOs and 3 
                                                          
3
 Jointly organized by Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Agriculture of Myanmar and LIFT, this workshop 
featured expert’s inputs on methods for design, monitoring and evaluation of development projects, rural 
growth, decentralization, institutional learning and related topics, among many other things. 
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INGOs, were purposively selected to ensure variation in three factors: a) types of village 
organizations; b) geographical coverage; and c) experience of mobilizing VOs.  
3.1.3 Survey 
A survey was conducted during November 23- December 4, 2013; self-completion questionnaires 
were distributed to all 32 international and local organizations receiving LIFT grants between 2010 
and 2013. An attempt was made to reach as many I/NGOs as possible by distributing 
questionnaires through email and following up by telephone. Only 6%, 3 INGOs, did not respond to 
the survey. The questionnaire covered the following areas: types of village organizations supported 
by the I/NGO; number of newly established VOs for LIFT project and number of VOs from previous 
projects; brief description about the role and function of the VOs; and different types of I/NGO 
support and resources provided to the VOs. This survey gave me a standardized and systematic 
method for gauging variation between the I/NGOs (Bryman, 2008, p. 42): it gave me a consistent 
benchmark for comparing all the 32 respondents and revealed important features and type of VOs 
mobilized by the I/NGOs.  
3.1.4 Focus group discussion 
Focus group participants were chosen from among the I/NGOs who had reported in the survey 
their willingness to be involved in a further discussion. Six international and local organizations 
were approached for FGDs during 13-21 December, 2013.  It was useful to conduct FGDs per 
organization than individual interviews at this stage, because I wanted to quickly obtain a range of 
views regarding VOs within the I/NGO. All the discussion were done solely in English, except for 
times when translations were needed with some field staffs. I was assisted by Aung Aung Kyaw, 
LIFT monitoring officer, who accompanied me to all the FGDs and helped with the translations. For 
the discussions, I used non-directive style of interviewing and open ended questions, which allowed 
the respondents to talk freely and spontaneously. The main focus was to allow the respondents to 
come out with their thoughts and stories. Building on the general data gathered from the survey, 
FGDs revealed ‘valuable insights’ (Bryman, 2008, p.47) about the rationalizations and arguments 
behind mobilization of VOs and their effects on Myanmar’s development discourse.  
3.1.5 Semi-structured interviews 
After the FGDs, I followed up with five semi-structured interviews in the last week of December, 
2013. Interviews were conducted in English with four LIFT staffs- programme manager, monitoring 
and evaluation officer, civil society officer and delta programme coordinator-, and UNDP livelihoods 
and recovery expert. The purpose of these interviews was to gather a macroscopic view of issues 
 
 
15 
surrounding village organizations in Myanmar. Guiding questions were prepared in advance, which 
provided a framework to ensure that key areas were covered during the interviews. But flexibility 
was retained to pursue issues of particular relevance and probe for details.  
3.2 Analysis of data  
Data analysis commenced by looking for the common themes shared by all sample I/NGOs, and the 
differences that set them apart. I then assessed each organization and its projects separately. I have 
analyzed and treated data based on two qualitative techniques, first typology analysis to categorize 
different type of village organizations in the survey results, and second- inductive analysis to 
develop generalizations about village organizations from the experiences of sample respondents. 
Inductive analysis was appropriate for this study because it focuses on finding the essence and 
meaning to the experiences of participants in mobilizing VOs, and then building up generalizations 
through a bottom-up approach (Creswell, 2009, p. 133). Accordingly, this inductive process allowed 
me to organize the data into increasingly abstract units of information until certain comprehensive 
themes emerged from the process (Creswell, 2009, p. 135). As a result, I was able to draw a more 
complete account of the VOs and their effect in Myanmar’s development. 
3.3 Ethical considerations 
I have thoroughly abided by the researcher’s code of ethics (Bryman, 2008, p.51) throughout the 
research process. Safeguards have been employed to protect the respondent’s rights (ibid) - every 
participant in the study has been articulated about the objective of the study and informed consent 
has been attained before focus group discussions and interviews. On the other hand, decisions 
regarding informant’s anonymity were left to the informant (Creswell, 2009, p.148). All the 
participants have approved disclosure of their names, and therefore mentioned in the list of 
participants in Appendix- I. The research has also been made as participatory as possible; 
participation of respondents in the study has been voluntary and the initial findings have been 
shared to the respondents to suggest corrections for possible misinterpretations and validate the 
findings.  
3.4 Limitations of the study 
Although originally thought, field work at village level was dropped due to number of bottlenecks. 
The bottlenecks included limitations on travel permits, there were processing delays and curtailed 
access to majority of the villages, while development workers also needed to be accompanied by 
local officials to the villages, which only made my access to villages largely off limits. Nonetheless, 
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since I was a UNOPS intern, alongside my identity as an independent researcher, I leveraged my 
intern position to access a rich harvest of internal monitoring reports and case studies about VOs in 
LIFT funded projects. As such I have partially tapped into the voice of VOs through secondary LIFT 
data. However, it is important to note that the research questions and hence the findings are 
deliberately situated at the macro and meso level, at the level of implementing international and 
national organizations.   
While, VOs’ ultimate goal to improve full participation and representation of end beneficiaries in 
the development process is a long-term impact, introduction of VOs is fairly new to Myanmar’s 
development process. Also, most of the I/NGO projects in question of this study were still ongoing 
during the time of my fieldwork. I fully acknowledge that this study warrants for a much later 
assessment and the findings I have uncovered only hints towards upcoming achievements and 
potential effects of VOs in near future. 
4 Conceptual basis  
International and national organizations engaged in development efforts have recognized the need 
not only for economic development but also for human development. Efforts have shifted globally 
from standalone project intervention to including institution building and citizen involvement. 
According to this perspective, development is viewed as not merely increased income for poor and 
economic growth for a nation, but also on pattern of behavior, decision making in communities, 
organization skills, and local self-reliance. Development then becomes something that people and 
communities do to themselves than something that is done to them by others (Umpleby, 2002, p. 5).  
4.1 The emergence of participation 
This emergence of ‘participatory development’ however has its own long history. According to 
Escobar (1995) and Chambers (1997), ‘normal’ development is characterized by biases, which are 
disempowering. These biases were Eurocentric; where development was merely an issue of 
economic growth, and implemented by government in a deliberated top-down hierarchy. This 
meant an overarching phenomenon to equate development with ‘modernity’ as achieved by the 
western countries and to copy them in a series of rational planning by experts. In the flipside, the 
non- experts, poor and local people were the problems which were to be solved by education and 
technology transfer (Chambers, 1997). Local people were the objects of grandiose, national 
schemes and project plans. From 1950s through later 1980s, professionals and experts were 
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considered to be the answers to development challenges, while development projects were 
organized and implemented by government agencies and centrally implemented, which often 
produced inappropriate solutions (Israr, et al., 2009).  
This ideology was increasingly challenged and undermined; in particular radicals (Friere, 1970) 
advocated participatory action research, which advocated for people’s participation in their 
learning environments. The research methods for doing this were inspired by Paulo Freire and 
have grown into a veritable industry (see Chambers, 1997: 106-13), but all center upon trying to 
see the world from the point of view of those directly affected by the developmental intervention. 
Added to this were academics, most notably Robert Chambers (1983), who argued that ‘putting the 
last first’ was the only way to achieve rural development. Unlike the expert knowledge of normal 
development, participatory development stresses the necessity of local knowledge. The expert 
systems of modernity depend solely on scientific approaches where planners worked from 
normative social models so that the recipients of development were treated as passive or, more 
often, conservative and obstructive. Participatory development reverses this. According to 
Chamber, the essence of participation is change and reversals- of role, behavior, relationship and 
learning. It is a move from a model of outsider driven domination, lecturing and transfer of 
technology and rational planning by experts to  a plurality of development goals to be realized at 
the grassroots level; giving the community self determination to planning and implementation of 
development intervention that affect them (ibid). As a result, development initiatives have now 
transformed to bottom-up, participatory approach. Such bottom-up approach contrasts with top-
downism whereby the development agenda is externally set by national targets, projects or donors’ 
priorities.  
4.2 The new ‘Holy Grail’ 
There are numerous definitions of the term ‘participation’, which often varies between personal 
conceptions, project specific aspirations and different ideologies that contest what participation 
should achieve. If people participate, what are they gaining by participating? One view is 
instrumental whereby participation was cost effective and increases efficiency of ‘formal’ 
development programmes: with participation, local people do more; projects cost less; and 
achievements are more sustainable (Chambers, 1998, p. 12). Another view is empowerment, the 
participation of citizens in decision making processes that affect their lives and access to 
accountability mechanisms is fundamental for sustainable societies and poverty reduction. 
Centrally led, top-down development policies and projects cannot alone solve the complexities of 
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rural development and it is the people themselves who have to be empowered to lead their 
development. Participation is, thus, fundamentally concerned with helping communities to help 
themselves and to achieve greater influence over decisions that affect their lives (Gilchrist & Taylor, 
2011, p. 75). Put (1999, p.17) wisely intertwines these two group of thoughts and reminds that two 
variables are decisive for any transaction in participatory development; institutional and target 
group. Participation of target beneficiaries is indispensable to making development efficient and 
work but, for such participatory development to occur target group should be organized and must 
possess certain institutional variables like human, material and financial resource, stable internal 
structure and stimulating leadership to achieve desired development objectives (Put, 1999, p. 18). 
Though I want to avoid one particular definition of participatory development, it is beneficial to 
look at some of the major approaches. Development agencies today widely define participation as 
“co-determination and power sharing throughout the project cycle” (reference). Participation in 
this context involves external and local agencies working towards a shared end on a project basis; 
the implication being that the project was reasonably circumscribed. Equally, participation has also 
grown as a new orthodoxy in the World Bank. Since mid-1990s, the World Bank has implemented 
flagship participation projects, and projects are monitored for their level of participation. In 
particular, the World Bank’s participatory poverty assessments stand out as their seminal 
introduction to this topic. For them participation entails involvement of stakeholders who 
“influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect 
them”. This recognition fed into the ‘good governance’ agenda which envisions shared 
responsibility for project implementation in contrast to 1980s where aid-receiving countries had 
their policies driven entirely by the donors (Mohan et al, 2000).  
4.3 Village organization- participation in practice 
Through late 1990s, developing countries have witnessed lesser role of the state and liberalization 
has particularly constituted in decentralization in particular aspect of public sector reform (EC, 
2013). It involved the transfer of a range of political authority and powers including responsibilities 
in service delivery, financial, human and administrative resources from higher levels in the political 
system to public authorities at lower level. For donors like European Commission, decentralization 
is inherently a political question that affects the overall organization of the development sector. 
Hence, support to village organizations from development partners should be envisaged only 
where there is political will to initiate or where decentralization reforms have already put in place 
(EC, 2013, pp. 10,11). In rejecting the statism and top-downism of ‘normal development’, the focus 
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for participatory development has thus become the local or grassroots level (Mohan and Stokke, 
2000). Increasingly, this has permitted a plurality of development goals that could be realized by 
giving local communities the self-determination it needs. In a development context, it has largely 
been interpreted as the realm of self-governing village organizations (Bernard, et al., 2007, p. 5). 
These village organizations are bottom-up institutions that apply participatory dictum that ‘people 
know, people discuss and people supervise’. The purpose is to demonstrate what is possible when 
people work together at the local level. In this perspective, VOs encourage the participation of local 
people in analyzing their problems and opportunities, and finding out solutions to solve their 
problems. 
Ever since, village organizations have been the interface for participation and increasingly 
considered as essential partners by development agencies, which frequently rely on VOs to 
implement their programs/projects (Israr, et al., 2009; Chambers, 1997; Bernard, et al., 2007). As a 
result, VOs today have prevailed as new custom of development; almost all donor funded projects 
stress on participatory approach to development; social mobilization and organization components 
at the village level (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). This particularly is the case for community-driven 
development programs based on decentralization and participation (Mansuri & Rao, 2004, p. 3).  
4.3.1 Social Capital  
Like participatory development, village organizations are also contested territories. There is a 
considerable heterogeneity across VOs in terms of what they do, their scope and scale of work, 
underlying intervention assumptions, and their de facto structure and functions. Some of the 
organizations are strong and sustainable while others are weak and scattered organizations. 
However, what is certain about VO is their role in rural development, which derives from the 
importance of social capital in growth, poverty reduction, and sustainable development (Uphoff & 
Wijayaratna, 2000). For theorist Putnam and James Coleman (1990), social capital is a collective 
resource on which individuals can draw. Portes (1995, p.12) however describes it as an individual 
resource- “the capacity of individuals to acquire scarce resources by virtue of their membership in 
networks or broader social structures. Pierre Bourdieu, on the other hand, argue social capital as an 
individual resource which like any other form of capital is inequitably distributed and thus 
reinforcing existing divisions and privileges in the society (Bourdieu, 1986). It was Michael 
Woolcock (1986) who bridged these dimensions and demystified social capital in three layers 
(Gilchrist & Taylor, 2011, p. 46-47):  
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 Bonding social capital, which derives from strong relationship between people in similar 
situations, such as close friends and neighbors, 
 Bridging social capital, which is weaker but involves wider connection between different 
people, or different ethnics or geographical communities, and 
 Linking social capital, which describes connections between people that cut across status 
and link people with differing levels of power, service users and service providers 
So what does this mean for village organizations? The distinction between different types of social 
capital is particularly important because, social changes and empowerment cannot be achieved 
alone by working at the village level on small scale development projects. Bridging and linking 
social capital are needed to harness resources and influence beyond the village, to connect with 
allies and broader social movements. While many disadvantaged communities in the villages are 
characterized by strong ties, they are poorly connected with those outside their boundaries, other 
communities and power holders. Village organizations therefore need to build trust and 
relationships within and between heterogonous communities as well as with power holders in 
order to identify and act on common interests (Gilchrist & Taylor, 2011, p. 48). Narayan (2001), 
further stresses that VOs presence and shared history with their beneficiaries provide a 
fundamental basis for social capital, but these relationships should be embedded in inclusive 
membership and active participation.  
4.3.2 Powerful Processes  
As discussed in the previous chapter, it is clear that village organization, whether their aspirations 
instrumental or empowerment, both the processes is fundamentally about power, power of 
villagers to access decisions that shape their lives. In village organizations power is inherently a 
political struggle for project beneficiaries to retain privileges or access to accountability 
mechanisms in development and in a broader local context. Many of the theories of state (since we 
see decentralization as a driving motor for establishment of village organizations) see power as a 
zero sum commodity game i.e. the powerless can gain power by only taking it away from those who 
have it. From this point of view, it can imply that power is being granted on communities and is in 
someone else’s gift (and by influence can be taken away). This school of thinking arises from 
Michael Foucault’s analogy of power as domination, that there is no avoiding of domination and 
there is no reasoning independent of it (Gilchrist & Taylor, 2011, pp. 54-57). In Foucault’s ideas 
governing has become a domain of strategies, techniques and procedure, namely here participatory 
development, through which villages and communities can be mobilized, enrolled and positioned in 
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novel development programmes, “they might be seen as acting as their own overseers… believing 
themselves to be free of powerful domination, making their own choices, pursuing their own 
interests and forming their own conclusions and priorities” (Lukes, 2005, p. 12). In reality, many 
supposedly pro-participation development agencies are incredibly powerful and show a marked 
reluctance or controlled processes to release control. Central to Foucault’s argument is that 
exercise of power requires complaince of willing subjects and how this complaince is secured. For 
village organizations, this underlines the importance to understand how power works between 
them and their host I/NGO, relationship with the state and local stakedholders, and to make this 
interactive power visible and demystify their own governance space.  
Sherry Arnstein’s (1969) pivotal ‘ladder of participation’ addresses this question of  who has the 
power and how  much power VOs have. Her influential participation typology has eight ‘rungs’ based 
on degrees or levels of participation from manipulation at the bottom to citizen control at the top. 
Although the ladder of participation seems a hierarchy, it is a continuum of levels of power from 
non-participation (manipulation and therapy), through degrees of tokenism (in ascending order 
informing, consultation and placation) to rungs of citizen power (partnership, delegated power and 
citizen Control) (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein’s theory shifts the argument away from power as zero-
or positive-sum model and emphasizes the potential for agency within VOs than confining it as a 
project structure. 
5 Findings and Discussion 
Initial survey from the first stage showed that of all 32 I/NGOs approached, 29 I/NGOs at least   
used village organizations in their projects funded through livelihoods and food security trust fund. 
3 INGOs did not respond to the survey request, which had their program focal person on leave 
during the enquiry. The respondent organizations reported to have mobilized 4988 VOs in total; of 
which about 56% were newly established after the LIFT funding. The remaining 2228 VOs were 
mobilized mostly in the Delta region and continuation from post-cyclone (Nargis) interventions.  
Asked to self-report the type of VOs mobilized in their projects, answers from the respondent 
I/NGOs recorded 32 different types throughout Myanmar. Village Savings and Loan Association 
(VSLA) are the most common type, 30% of the total reported VOs, and mobilized by 4 I/NGOs 
across Myanmar, followed by Community Based Organization (CBO), which comprise 26.7% of the 
total VO share but implemented by only 1 INGO. Third in the list is Self-Reliance Group (SRG) which 
is implemented by 7 I/NGOs and constitute 13% of total VOs. Meanwhile, Village Development 
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Committee (VDC) is the fourth largest type, which constitute 10.2% of the total VOs, and 
implemented by 11 I/NGOs. And, Farmer Field School Committee (FFS), a type of farmer’s self-help 
group, is implemented by 3 I/NGOs and constitute 7% of the total VOs share.   
The remaining 13% of the VOs are 28 different types of self-help and/or project groups closely knit 
around I/NGOs standalone project activity, e.g. forest user group, machinery group, tea producer 
group, aquaculture group, baking group, etc.  
5.1 Organizations in spotlight 
As described in the methodology section, the sample respondents selected for second leg of data 
collection, focus group discussions, are purposively selected to represent different types of VOs 
recorded in the survey, their geographical coverage and I/NGOs experience in mobilizing the VOs.  
For VDCs, because it was implemented by higher number of survey respondents, two I/NGOs were 
selected- Helpage International, an INGO, and Thadar Consortium, a NGO consortium. Helpage 
International is currently mobilizing 30 newly created VDCs in Sagaing and Mandalay regions. And, 
Thadar Consortium currently mobilizes 37 newly created VDCs in the four regions of central 
lowlands, also called Dry Zone. Thadar, however, has longer experience of mobilizing VDCs in the 
Delta region after the cyclone Nargis, and just before the political reforms started to take hold in 
Myanmar. 
Two INGOs, Pact and Proximity Design, were selected for VSLA and CBO respectively. Both the 
organizations are renowned to have a big village portfolio and mobilized a great number of village 
organizations. Proximity has mobilized the highest number of village organizations compared to 
any other organizations in the survey- 744 new CBOs and 573 old CBOs, and proclaimed to 
outreach 80% of Myanmar’s rural areas.  Pact on the other hand works with 318 new VSLA across 
Myanmar. In particular, Pact is also one of the few longest serving INGOs working in Myanmar and 
used to mobilize 926 SRGs, another type of village organization, before political-economic reforms 
took shape in 2012.   
Myanmar Ceramic Society (MCS) and Metta Development Foundation, two local NGOs were selected 
for SRG and FFS respectively. MCS works with 149 old and 149 new SRGs in 7 pottery villages of 
Shan state and Sagaing division with a specific target group, potters and their families. Meanwhile, 
Metta works in the conflict areas of in two northern states of Myanmar- Shan and Kachin. Metta is 
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currently mobilizing 40 new FFS committees and 160 old FFS, which were established during 2001 
to 2011.  
5.1.1 Helpage International 
Helpage International is an international NGO that has been working in Myanmar since 2003. 
Majority of Helpage’s work is carried out through self-governing VDCs which are set up to reduce 
poverty in the rural areas (HelpAge, 2014). The VDCs comprise of subcommittees which administer 
specific project activities, e.g. agriculture, livelihoods, education, health, fund raising, and income 
generation sub committees. The subcommittees are convened by project beneficiaries, who then 
democratically form a representative central committee overlooking Helpage’s work within the 
village. Helpage claim to use an ‘inclusive development’ approach to its project and VDCs. Gender 
balance is at the heart of inclusiveness of VDCs, which now necessitate 40% members to be women. 
During the project inception, “we focus on socialization with villagers before the formation of sub-
committees and VDC (FGD-HI, 2013).” Once the VDCs have instituted in the villages, Helpage 
provided series of trainings to VDC members on Integrated Community Action Plan (ICAP). After 
the completion of training, all VDCs organize an open village gathering where they find out different 
needs of communities and individuals. The villagers prioritize their needs and create an ICAP for 
their village. The focus on individual need is to ensure that vulnerable groups like elderly, women 
and people with disabilities also have their needs heard and prioritized in the action plan. Helpage’s 
staffs facilitate and provide guidance during the planning processes in every project village.  
Helpage cannot fund all the activities from VDC’s ICAP, but try to link their project fund to the 
prioritized activities. Helpage’s modality of VDCs aspires to make development activities in villages 
demand driven and beneficiary initiated.  
5.1.2 Thadar Consortium  
Thadar Consortium consists of six local NGOs and was formed by Action Aid, an international NGO, 
after cyclone Nargis in 2009. The consortium currently uses VDCs as a bridge between them and 
the villages they serve. The members of these VDCs are representatives from existing traditional 
organizations within the villages, elders, religious leaders and village authorities. Normally, the VDC 
has 9 committee members, with a 4 member executive board of president, secretary, treasurer and 
accountant, while the remaining members lead community based organizations and/or user groups 
formed under the supervision of VDC to manage agricultural and livestock activities, e.g. cow and 
goat breeding groups and revolving fund. Thadar’s support to the VDC ultimately aims at 
capacitating the VDCs to sustainably operate the revolving fund, which provides much needed 
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capital for poor farmers to set up micro enterprises and diversify their income source. During the 
onset of every VDC, Thadar facilitates a Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA), a village level meeting, 
where villagers create their own resource maps, identify all available economic resources in the 
village and their accessibility to poor households, especially vulnerable groups and women headed 
households (Lynn, 2012, p. 1). Each VDC create a ‘village book’ through an ongoing PRA. This village 
book is a document owned by the villagers, which contains information about socio-economic 
conditions of the village, existing problems and needs, as well as possible solutions identified by the 
villages and a plan to achieve the solutions. In order to make these village books relevant, it is 
revised and updated every year in an annual VDC meeting. As an exit strategy, Thadar has asked 
township authorities to conduct a handover ceremony of village books to both village authority and 
VDC in all their project villages. Doing so, Thadar believes will institutionalize the cooperation 
between VDCs and village authorities in future.  
5.1.3 Proximity Design 
Proximity Design is a Myanmar based, but registered in California, not-for-profit social enterprise 
established in 2004. The organization aims to reduce rural poverty through designing innovative 
and affordable market products and services4, which low income farmers purchase and use to grow 
higher value crops and significantly increase their incomes. Proximity is pro-market and has 
distributed its products and services to approximately 80 percent of Myanmar’s rural population 
through a network of independent village-level agents. Following Cyclone Nargis in 2008, Proximity 
also started designing and implementing humanitarian relief and development projects for rural 
population. Proximity’s projects reach villages through a community based organization, which 
brings together customers/beneficiaries in the villages for implementation of project activities. 
Organizing customers in a self-governing village organization gives them impetus to help villagers 
work their way out of poverty. All the customers and potential customers are members of the CBO, 
while an executive committee consisting of approximately 5-10 members is democratically elected 
from target customers and village leaders, who administer proximity’s project activity and handout 
of credit to product buyers and cash for work payments to mansions and laborers working in the 
infrastructure activities. Proximity considers it’s CBOs as innovative and low cost practical 
mechanisms to build group accountability, transparent decision making and good governance in its 
cash for work activities. Proximity provides facilitation and capacity strengthening of its CBO 
members to implement their project. Proximity attributes its market modality for sustainability of 
                                                          
4
 These products include foot-powered irrigation pumps, water storage containers, drip irrigation systems, 
solar lighting and farm advisory services. 
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its CBOs; because customers invest their money in proximity activities, the VOs will continue even 
after the donor funding cease out.  
5.1.4 Pact  
Pact is an international NGO, which specializes in using microfinance as a poverty reduction tool 
across developing countries. It has been working in Myanmar since 1997, at a time when very few 
other international NGOs were doing so (Muddit, 2012). Pact’s village organization, Micro Finance 
Centre (a type of VSLA), is based on a ground research to use microfinance as a tool for poverty 
reduction in Myanmar. This approach supports women to build transparent savings and credit 
groups at village level and empowers them with financial literacy needed to run microenterprises. 
Pact uses MFC, a type of village savings and loan association, to channel micro credit to 
beneficiaries in the project villages. The creditors in the villages are arranged in micro credit groups 
of 5-6 members, which then democratically elect a central governing federation called micro 
finance committees (PACT, 2014). Like other I/NGOs, Pact introduces its project through a village 
level workshop, open to all villagers, where its loan products and rules and regulations surrounding 
it are explained. Loan officer from PACT conducts a PRA and creates a wealth ranking of rich, 
moderate, poor and poorest in the village. Interested loan borrowers from moderate, poor and 
poorest ranks are identified and organized in micro credit groups according to their 
neighborhoods. A MFC is then federated in every village with 10 members selected democratically 
from the micro credit groups. This VO coordinates Pact’s project activities, loan disbursements, 
payment of interest and principal within the villages.   
5.1.5 Myanmar Ceramic Society 
MCS was established as a local NGO in 2005 and envisions to revive the traditional technology of 
glazing and to rehabilitate the livelihood of potter families, who are living in subsistent conditions. 
MCS does this by setting up self-reliance groups, which bring together the potter families in a closed 
group. “Through SRGs, MCS provides vocational training on business planning, traditional and 
modern ceramic making, technology transfer, loans to kick start ceramic micro-enterprises, and 
logistics support for livelihood development of potter communities (FGD-MCS, 2013).” MCS uses a 
collaborative approach with the government authorities in setting up its village organization. MCS 
conducted two consultation meetings in every village which led to formation of Self Reliance 
Groups (SRGs); one with potters who own a kiln, and another for potter households without a kiln 
(Monitoring-MCS, 2011). MCS also has an organizational membership across most of its targeted 
potter villages. These members also play an important role in identifying the members for SRG 
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committees. The SRGs bring together all the creditors from pottery households in a group of 8 
members, who like in PACT approach, then democratically elect a central governing association 
called Village Management Committee. However, there are two types of SRGs, one which 
administers the micro credit financing for the well-off potters, i.e. kiln owners, and another which 
administers the micro revolving fund for the poor potter family households who do not have a kiln 
to make ceramic potteries. The revolving funds are different because borrowers first practice 
regular savings before they can access small loans (50-100USD) and with a payback time for 
interest and principal. When the members successfully complete their loan paybacks and have been 
able to own a kiln, they become eligible for micro-credits. In micro credit schemes, the potters have 
access to loan (200 to 700USD) directly from a private bank, where MCS works as a guarantee and 
spares the borrowers from having to deposit collateral.  
5.1.6 Metta Development Foundation 
Metta Development Foundation is a local NGO registered in 1998 with the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
The organization is recognized for pioneering Farmers Field School (FFS) programs in Northern 
states of Myanmar to diversify rice production, upland agriculture, and community forestry and 
nursery. Initially Metta’s FFS began in 2001 in Kachin and Shan state, but after the political reforms 
and influx of donors in 2011, it has scaled up its work to Kayah state and Irrawady division of 
Myanmar. The main objective of the FFS is to provide agriculture technology and farm business 
management to farmers to help increase their agricultural productivity. Metta’s claims to have set 
up its FFS committee on a community based participatory approach. Metta’s approach to formation 
and mobilization of FFS is in fact a non-confrontational approach and power brokering with village 
gatekeepers, which remain unaltered since its early days in 2001. Metta has established a FFS for 
every project village, which organizes 25-30 farmers in a committee and provides direct support 
such as technical trainings, small grants and loans for farming activities, and low-tech agriculture 
equipment. During its project inception, Metta liaises with these gatekeepers, namely village 
leaders, elders, and monks in a workshop before forming a FFS committee in a new village. These 
gatekeepers participate in a FFS planning and deliberately suggest members for the formation of 
Metta’s VO. An executive committee of president, secretary, treasurer and accountant is however, 
selected by the members of FFS. The FFS executive committee decides on a study plot and regular 
meeting place, which are attended by all FFS members in regular sessions (FGD-Metta, 2014). 
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5.2 Why form new village organizations? 
All organizations in FGDs unequivocally claim that they are setting up VOs to fill the void of civic 
engagement in their project villages. The extent to which development organizations feel the need 
to establish new organizations at village level is interesting given that collective action at that level 
is so common and village based traditional and administrative organizations already exist. Kempel’s 
(2012, p.3) study about VOs in four states of Myanmar recorded between seven to twenty 
organizations per village. These include administrative (government), traditional socio-religious 
and some I/NGO facilitated organizations. The most common VO is village tract and village 
administration, which is the lowest tier of government administration, followed by socio religious 
youth group and pagoda or church trustees, which exist in almost all villages. Elders particularly, 
have a special designation in Burmese society and almost all villages have an elders’ council called 
Village Elders and Respected Persons (VERPs). The other traditional organizations, like socio-
religious youth group conduct some development related activities and mobilize broad 
participation from a wide segment of the village population, but do not take any leading role in 
decision making and development affairs (ibid). The World Bank study in fact did not find any 
development oriented village organizations that had arisen organically or that preexisted aid 
programmes (WB, 2012, p.59). And, for all the old village organizations reported by the survey 
respondents, upon close inquiry on FGDs, it was clear that all of them were actually established by 
the I/NGOs in their previous projects. None of these VOs had evolved or continued from any 
traditional forms or other I/NGO facilitated VOs.  So why form these new village organizations? 
5.2.1 Political renewal 
Myanmar’s political reforms and opening up has had significant impact on all I/NGOs. Prior to 2011, 
village organization had to include village chiefs and government officials in their executive 
committees. With ushering political changes and shift towards people-centered development, 
Burmese government has opened space for development agencies to promote democracy at the 
micro level and mobilize autonomous village organizations (Thein, 2013). Proximity, HelpAge and 
PACT’s VOs are utilizing these reforms to bar any village authorities and government officials from 
the management of its VOs. FGDs also infer that village authorities lack participatory development 
credentials and claim I/NGOs to be the real implementers of government’s people centered 
development paradigm. Meanwhile, MCS, Thadar and Metta use a non-confrontational approach 
with village authorities who are even included in their VO memberships.  
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Looking back at the military regime, Myanmar had government installed village chiefs and 
administrators, who implemented development projects in villages without any consideration for 
participation of villagers (Kempel, 2012). Selection of projects and budget spending were opaque, 
whereby village administrators had power over selection of members in any village organizations, 
including that of I/NGO projects (FGD-Metta, 2014). The government-led development approach, 
like in other developing countries until the wake of participation in 1990s, was centralized and 
expert led (Chambers, 1997). It put the intended beneficiaries of development, these very villagers 
and communities, in a passive position. Myanmar’s new rural development framework aims to 
rectify these aforementioned shortcomings in two aspects, one focusing on public engagement, the 
other on democratization (Myint, 2013). It aims to lay foundation for ‘new’ Myanmar, where the 
state derives legitimacy from the people's will, while securing accountability for state actions, and 
the potential for achieving devolution of power to the lowest rung of administration- villages. Such 
participatory paradigm attempts to introduce a bottom-up style of development in order to remedy 
the government-led approach's shortcomings, specifically by focusing on qualitative improvements 
in local society's participation (JICA, 2012). I/NGOs are tapping into this new development space 
and setting up autonomous VOs in their project areas. This can be also viewed in a broader canvas 
of aid effectiveness- of development agencies that are aligning their objectives with the 
government’s development strategies. All FGD participants also believe that this plurality of VOs at 
the grassroots will be fundamental to Myanmar’s sustainable development.    
5.2.2 Getting rid of the ‘obsolete’  
Helpage and Proximity openly express their distrust and lack of confidence in the government and 
traditional organizations as a reason to create new autonomous VOs. These INGOs see the 
government as quasi-civilian, composed of the same old guards and their handpicked village 
administrators, and claimed to be independent of government monopoly and without any hidden 
political interests.   
As part of the political reforms, the government has created Village Administration Council (VAC)5 
in every villages of Myanmar, which comprise seven members responsible for local development 
(Kempel, 2012). The members are drawn from influential village leaders and village administrators 
who are brought together by the township officials. These village leaders are recognized figures 
within the villages, but do not have previous administration and management experience (ibid). In 
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 Each village has several village administrators (VA) who are the leaders of 100 households and report to the 
Village Tract Administrator (VTA). VAC/VTA have an officially sanctioned position and authority over the 
villages. 
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spite of village administration, village elders however have a significant say in the village matters. 
They act in a senior advisory position and informally take up the village governance, sometimes to 
an extent where VAC is in fact playing a nominal role (Kempel, 2012, p. 4). Meanwhile, other 
traditional organizations in the villages solely focus on socio-religious activities, but none of them 
implement any livelihoods and poverty reduction activities intended at individual households. They 
also do not have any formal mechanisms for leadership transfers (ibid). Power in the villages is 
thus uncritically concentrated at the hands of few. Field managers of almost all I/NGOs, except for 
MCS, reminded that irrespective of new makeover of village administration, VACs continue 
previous culture of elitism and hierarchy within villages. 
“Under military rule, everything was controlled from the township level through one 
government appointed village administrator. With current structure, control continues but 
through several members of VACs (FGD-HI, 2013).”  
Henkel & Strait (as mentioned in Lentfer & Yachkaschi, 2009) refers this distrust on the state 
institutions as a ‘new orthodoxy’ of participatory development, which is based on the notion that 
bottom-up is morally superior, and empowerment and inclusion of the marginal is stressed. FGD 
participants infer the vacuum for participatory organization in villages as the major reason for 
creating VOs in their development projects. Such motivation has its root in Freirean philosophy of 
radical empowerment, which associates both individual and class action with the transformation 
structures of subordination through radical changes in law, rights and the institutions of society 
(Geyer & Chechetto-Salles, 2006). Since, the existing traditional organizations do not implement 
activities targeted for individual households, I/NGOs also derive an obvious need to create a VO 
which caters to the individual needs. It is in this backdrop, Helpage and Proximity claim to have set 
up truly representative and participatory VOs in their project areas. Helpage and Proximity 
envision its VOs to spearhead local development and champion democratic decision making at the 
village level. 
5.2.3 In market we trust 
Economic liberalization has provided immense development opportunity for Myanmar. But, these 
opportunities are very urban centered (Kreuscher, 2013). Proximity envisions these market to be 
available to rural villages as Myanmar continues to grow economically; villagers should have 
platforms to voice their opinions freely and choose their products from the market. As part of 
economic liberalization, the role of state is shrinking, and to a romanticized extent, expects 
communities to become self-financing (Gilchrist & Taylor, 2011, p. 141).  Accordingly, Proximity 
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uses its CBOs to be micro institutions of economic growth. Much like in other developing countries, 
who have taken democratic reforms, the state is the fall guy in much political rhetoric (Chambers, 
1997) of Myanmar today. The government is reducing its role and opening up space for 
development and market actors to address the needs of rural villagers. Proximity’s approach is very 
much market driven such that it uses term ‘customers’ instead of beneficiaries in its development 
work (Monitoring_visit_Proximity, 2013). The organization is outspoken against charity based 
development and believes that the best way to address poverty is to design, build, and market 
affordable products that poor people are willing to buy. In order to do that Proximity established 
CBOs to spend more time with its customers, conduct in depth conversations and understand their 
needs.  
“Poor people won’t spend their limited financial resources, if our products do not meet their 
needs and add value. It requires having close relationship with people you are trying to help, 
and a relationship that’s based on trust and empathy, a relationship that is equal exchange 
where they are open with their feedback (Din, 2013).”  
This market based approach is a very much discovery process, where you learn by doing the work, 
where you get feedback from people you are trying to help (Schwartz, 2013, p. 3). Proximity 
underscores the importance of having a strong grassroots presence with their village organizations; 
they believe to have insights on what is going on in the villages, in terms of economic development, 
entrepreneurship climate and rural people’s needs. Proximity also uses its VO to regularly take 
inputs about the market gaps and service demands underserved by commercial and government 
sector. This rich harvest of data enables proximity to be responsive to its customers’ needs and 
feedbacks. Being a social enterprise, Proximity also shares its business data with other 
stakeholders, which fosters evidence based business development at the village level. 
In Pact, the choice for opting MFC is also directly influenced by Myanmar’s economic liberalization. 
From 1997 to 2011, Pact’s work in Myanmar was possible because of its partnership with UNDP, 
which was one of the few international organizations with global operational immunity in Myanmar 
(Muddit, 2012, p. 2). Thus, Pact also adopted UNDP’s VO modality- self-reliance groups for its 
project activities. But in 2011, the government ushered in economic reforms and passed 
‘Microfinance Institution Law’ which authorized microfinance agencies like Pact to offer their 
services freely (Muddit, 2012). Ever since, Pact has set up its own MFCs to deliver microcredit in its 
project areas. Unlike SRG, MFC is not a voluntary organization; the borrowers are obliged to be part 
of the micro credit groups. MFCs are market driven and require borrowers to submit their business 
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idea along with their loan application (PACT, 2014). Most importantly, “MFC integrates villagers to 
the banking system, without which Myanmar’s economic rejuvenation is all but a dream. We are 
taking financial services to rural people (FGD-Pact, 2013).” 
5.2.4 Small and medium enterprise development 
As the multifaceted reforms deepen in Myanmar, the ‘development engine’ is set in motion by 
means of private capital accumulation- a process that was basic to the old concept of economic 
development (Wignaraja, 2005, pp. 1165-1167). Small and medium scale enterprises (SME), such 
as pottery enterprises, and their access to capital are receiving much attention and Myanmar’s rural 
development framework in fact considers it as foundation for the country’s development (Myint, 
2013). The framework particularly prioritizes village based SMEs as engines of economic growth 
and considers the poor as part of the solution (ibid). This is the sway of neoliberal thinking over 
participation discourse, which recognizes that the poor can also contribute to growth (Collion & 
Rondot, 1998). In MCS, self-reliance groups were created to provide potter households with access 
to capital and banking services, which is expected to expedite rural growth and reduce poverty.  
According to MCS, the lack of affordable credit and lack of savings practices prevent pottery villages 
from taking full advantage of economic opportunities in front of them. This is compounded due to 
the banking law and regulations that still require collateral from the borrowers. SRG fills this gap by 
by providing much needed capital to the potter entrepreneurs. MCS liaises as a third party for the 
SRGs and guarantees the bank with a fixed deposit of about USD 25000 for 3 years. The SRG 
members have quick receipt of much needed capital, while the bank has confidence in disbursing 
loans to small scale pottery enterprises. The borrowers also gain critical experience in dealing with 
the bank and by the end of MCS project, the SRGs are envisioned to run as successful SMEs and raise 
collateral for themselves. SRGs thus fulfil the governments’ and development agencies search for a 
self-sustaining capital accumulation. This pro-poor growth strategy is based on generating 
organizations of the poor as subjects in the accumulation process (Wignaraja, 2005, p. 1165). Even 
in the narrower conception of SRGs, the pattern of growth is on the poor having access to credit and 
then to invest. This pattern of growth then provides the link between political democracy and 
economic liberalization, initially at the micro level.  
Meanwhile for the poorest of potter households, who do not own a kiln, SRGs provide revolving 
funds which enable them to make some savings and invest in the kiln. Once this happened, the new 
kiln owners graduate to become recipients of micro credit schemes. In doing so, MCS argues to have 
eased poor villagers’ access to banking and finance. Ultimately, through SRGs, MCS envisions potter 
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“In phase-I projects, there were 
lot of I/NGOs running around 
and creating VOs to channel 
aid. The numbers were too 
many, this simply could not 
continue. At least in LIFT, we 
pushed for aid coordination at 
local level (Collet, 2013).” 
 
households to expand their businesses with extra capital and setting up a sustainable ceramic 
enterprise. 
5.2.5 Response to cyclone Nargis 
Though VOs have sprawled exponentially after Myanmar’s political reforms, it also has some roots 
in the recent past. Aid analysts conclude that Cyclone Nargis in 2008 was a watershed moment in 
Myanmar’s development discourse. The humanitarian crisis and mounting international 
condemnation of the state incapacity to respond it resulted in the military government to open 
space for international aid (Maung, 2012). Many INGOs intervened in the affected Delta region and 
delivered aid through various village based organizations (Kempel, 2012). Thadar Consortium was 
in fact conceived to help people restore their livelihoods 
activities as well as to implement relief and recovery work in 
the cyclone affected areas of Delta. In its phase-I project (2010-
2011), Thadar mobilized village organizations primarily to 
deliver assistance to the target beneficiaries, and worked 
individually like many other I/NGOs. The organizations did not 
have participatory components like village consultation 
meetings and democratic decision making; however they did 
bring villagers in various single-purpose project groups.  
The donors, overwhelmed by the astounding number of VOs in the Delta, encouraged I/NGOs for a 
harmonized process for their phase-II projects (2011-2012); this intended to avoid duplication and 
fragmentation at the village level (Naytun, 2013). Development agencies like Thadar realized this 
by consolidating existing VOs in their project areas into a centralized ‘village development 
committee’ and directed their projects through various sub-committees (FGD-TC, 2013). 
Contrasting Helpage approach, VDCs were culmination of donor’s ambition and reactive motive 
from Thadar. Also Thadar has a non-confrontational attitude to the village authorities, who convene 
the village gatherings and also set up criteria to appoint executive members of the VDC. 
5.2.6 Overarching motivations: instrumental vs. empowerment  
Interviews and FGDs suggest that the primary motivation of I/NGOs for setting up village 
organization is project driven. Eylers and Forster (1998, p.101) view this as instrumental 
understanding of participation, which perceives VOs as an effective mechanism to mobilize local 
resources for preconceived projects, increasing beneficiary engagement, and finally that implies the 
decentralization of decisions and control over development resources. Indeed most of the survey 
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respondents view VOs as village based project intermediaries, whose prime responsibility is to 
implement activities efficiently. For example, Proximity and Thadar term their VOs a bridge 
between villagers and their organization.  
I/NGOs also use their VOs to focus on specific segments and groups in villages. Pact only focuses on 
women, Metta only works with farmers, and MCS spends all its energy for potter households. Apart 
of purposively uplifting rural famers, Metta created FFS also to establish and maintain good 
relations with local authorities and agriculture extension workers in the area. FGD participants are 
convinced that FFS committees help them discuss, interact and understand the need of their target 
groups at different levels of project implementation. Specifically, participation of target groups at 
the grassroots level gives INGOs easy access for technical assessments and robust reporting 
mechanism (Gilchrist & Taylor, 2011, p. 61).  
“Having a village level organization makes delivering inputs, designing new tools, monitoring 
and surveying, and other relevant tasks easier throughout the project cycle (Monitoring-
Metta, 2012).”  
Nonetheless, the VOs also have an empowerment aspect to it. Initial survey results indicate that 
almost all VOs are strongly linked to an empowering process of villagers; through VOs villagers 
have a common voice and unprecedented bargaining power vis-à-vis government authorities and 
they are, to certain extent, planning and prioritizing development activities for their own villages. 
The ‘handing over’ of decision making power, together with capacity building at the grassroots, 
gives special meaning to the ‘empowerment’ of target groups (Eylers & Forster, 1998). In this 
perspective, participatory development consciously addresses how people negotiate and share 
control of development processes and, at least normatively, makes these processes accessible to the 
marginalized sections of society (ibid). Data from FGDs and LIFT monitoring reports reveal that 
most of the VOs are designed to be membership based organizations, developed, formed and 
managed by an inclusive group of community members, who are democratically elected by their 
respective communities to promote socio-economic development at the village level. For example, 
Helpage and Thadar established VDCs to weave villagers in one centralized organization. Helpage 
aims it VDCs to be inclusive development organizations, which builds on existing capacities and 
resources at the village level, but also empowers and takes along the marginalized groups in 
societies. By building the capacity of VOs executive committees and members of project activity 
groups, I/NGOs usually foresee villagers driving their own development, strengthening good 
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“We designed and began the broad 
usage of transparency notebooks, 
which are handled by our CBOs. We’ve 
learned how they can play a crucial 
role in establishing a culture of 
openness and accountability for an 
entire village by affirming the ‘right to 
information’ (FGD-Proximity, 2013).” 
 
governance practices at the local level and demanding accountability from local village authority 
simultaneously (MaNo, 2013).  
5.3 What has been the effect of mobilizing village organizations?  
Nevertheless, these empowering aspects of VOs should be accepted with caution. Kreuscher (2013, 
p.3) argues that VOs partnership with I/NGOs can unintentionally limit them into agents of 
assistance rather than empowered civil society actors. The shift from traditional organizations to 
project led VOs can make villagers reliant on external funding (not local contributions), and they 
might emulate the system that developed them—that is, the international aid agencies (Collet, 
2013). Much of the ‘capacity building’ provided to the VOs might teach them to comply with project 
requirements and reporting to host I/NGOs, rather than becoming independent entities addressing 
local problems with local people (ibid). Nonetheless, “….we see indications that good things are 
happening. Every village we go, first thing people tell us is [that] they are working, doing and 
achieving things together (Kreuscher, 2013).” So the pertaining question is what has been the effects 
of mobilizing these village organizations? Who benefits, what changes have occurred in the rural 
development space and what challenges remain? 
5.3.1 Participatory development and democratic governance 
All village organizations in question of this research are responsible for managing participatory and 
democratic processes. FGDs, interviews and LIFT internal monitoring reports confirm that 
performance and impact of village organizations has been very promising in terms of gender 
balance, social inclusions, transparency and accountability towards the villagers. Particularly, needs 
of individuals and usually neglected vulnerable groups like person with disabilities are being heard 
for the first time in a village level action planning. People are having their voice heard and confident 
to raise their opinions in public. All of this is having huge ramifications at micro level. 
Community consultation has been the cornerstone of 
all VOs. All I/NGOs, irrespective of their type of VOs, 
conducted a project sensitization workshop at the 
village level, which was open to everyone and 
transparently explained their project objectives. These 
meetings were used to ask people for ideas and 
suggestions, create action plans for village 
development and select beneficiaries among others. Participatory planning processes across all VOs 
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“The role of president and other 
executive members is to provide 
oversight and monitor the 
spending. Any spending and 
activity implementing within the 
village organizations require 
multiple approval and signatures 
from different executive members 
(FGD-Proximity, 2013).” 
has created a shared vision at the villages, which distributes the ownership of project activities and 
long term plans amongst wider village audience (Magyaun, 2012). This public engagement provides 
a strong and sustainable foundation for long term community commitment and citizen 
empowerment by creating dialogue and cooperation, which generates and demands accountability 
from all involved stakeholders (Gilchrist & Taylor, 2011, p. 79).  In case of Proximity, Helpage, and 
Thadar, their records of all project inputs are available for discussions at the villages. Every year 
their VOs also conduct a social audit where information on annual expenditure is accessible to 
everyone. These procedures have led to involvement and ownership of development interventions 
at the village level.  
All VOs also have a robust financial management system in 
place. Power over administration and financial management 
has been diversified across VO members, and this has 
significantly democratized development works in the 
villages. Chamber (1997) argues that this role of 
participatory development is fundamentally about power, 
power of villagers to access decisions that shape their lives. 
People now understand that it’s the committees that make 
and manage decisions rather than individual leaders. Power which was originally concentrated in 
hands of few, particularly village chiefs and elders is now devolved across different village 
organizations. VOs have resulted in ‘community self determination to planning’ (Israr, et al., 2009) 
and democratic implementation of development interventions.  
 “All of these participatory practices did not exist few years ago. Our people today have a say on 
how development happens in front of them (Consortium, 2012).” Regular interactions and working 
together for project activities has increased trust and solidarity amongst villagers. All VOs seem to 
be functioning very well, demonstrating the strengthening of relationships with the villagers and 
creating a sound platform for participatory planning and democratic decision making at the village 
level.  
5.3.2 Digging deeper into reality- whose voice? 
Village organizations are exposing people in most of the rural villages to democratic governance for 
the first time in Myanmar’s history. In almost all the VOs, except for MCS, people are electing their 
leaders democratically, decision about project activities are being made based on their priorities. 
However, the concept of a participatory VO and democratic decision-making is a very new found 
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luxury in Myanmar. According to the participants of Pact FGD, although executive members of their 
MFCs are elected democratically from their microcredit group members, village leaders and elites 
continue to have influence over the group. Village elders, monks and former village administrators 
have significant influence and even control members of VOs. These group of people command high 
respect from villagers and have historically been listened to. Not to forget that most of the MFC 
presidents are usually powerful people themselves, and for example, although, Pact releases their 
MFC leaders and appoints new ones annually to maintain power balance, the released leaders are 
recycled as heads of VOs set up by other development projects. Though, the political landscape has 
changed in Myanmar, VOs cannot run without closely collaborating with the village administrators 
and influential leaders.  
“They have been in driver’s seat and making decisions for a very long time. We cannot just 
expect them to stay silent and away from our projects (Jaiswal, 2013).” “One out of 20 CBOs in 
our projects experience custody of their budget from village chiefs (FGD-Proximity, 2013).”  
Most of the VOs discussed in this study appoint village chiefs and leaders in honorary and advisory 
positions to avoid conflict. Theoretically, they do not have their say in the project implementation, 
but it will take patience and some years to achieve this ideal stage. Chambers (1997, p.15) refers 
this challenge as frontiers of ‘disempowerment’- a long process of enabling powerful people to 
recognize power as a resource to be shared, where they can find fulfilment and satisfaction from 
disempowering themselves and empowering common villagers.  
Other limitations exist too. In case of MCS, SRG fellows were handpicked by the village leaders and 
MCS members. Metta has faced similar experiences in Shan state, where PNO has urged in several 
occasions to appoint their village leader as head of FFS committees.  Thadar claims that 
communities were in charge of deciding the agenda, membership and function of the VDCs, but in 
reality, village authorities and Thadar project staffs were involved hands-on selecting the agenda 
and negotiating members. Mosse (2001, p.19) calls this ‘patronage of project agencies’ over the 
‘planning knowledge’. Mosse particularly stresses on the difficulty to internalize participation 
procedurally, which is especially relevant for transitioning Myanmar. The transfer of autonomy and 
control to the local population is equally problematic; while, VOs are aspired to be setting their own 
development priorities, I/NGOs also have a need to meet their project objectives (ibid). This 
ultimately has resulted in a patronage between I/NGO field staff and the VOs. 
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“I am doubtful that many 
procedures of INGOs might not 
be attuned to diverse local 
contexts within Myanmar, 
[and] VO systems created for 
decision making and 
governance be actually ‘getting 
the job done’ and ‘meeting 
deadlines’ at the village level 
(Collet, 2013).” 
 
All VOs across 29 implementing organizations manage and monitor project activities at the village 
level, however only 59% of them allow their VOs to operate independently without their micro-
management. For example, only 5 out of 11 I/NGOs with VDCs 
have delegated beneficiary selection responsibility to their VOs. 
Similarly, all respondent organizations reported that neither the 
target beneficiaries nor the VOs had an opportunity to 
participate in the planning processes of the project activities, 
but were involved in the process of making village level action 
plans. The needs of local people in these action plans are in fact 
shaped by the perception of what the project agency could offer 
(Mosse, 2001, p.23). In spite of vision to inject participatory 
planning culture through VDCs, both Helpage and Thadar did not include VDC members and target 
beneficiaries for consultation about the type of support they received. These supports were 
determined by the project plans which preceded the creation of VDCs and their mobilization in the 
villages. This is ‘the new tyranny’ of participation, where project agencies apply VOs in a manner 
which fits into their organizational practice (Cooke & Kothari, 2001).  
5.3.3 Space for the vulnerable and voiceless  
Gender equity and social inclusion of the poor and vulnerable people is a basic founding principle 
across most of the VOs. In particular, VOs convened by HelpAge, Thadar and Proximity comprise of 
representatives from different groups, people with disabilities, women, middle class farmers, poor 
laborers, rich farmers. Components include ensuring that women are represented in all project-
supported VOs. In Pact almost all the micro credit group members are only women. This is by 
design (Muddit, 2012, p. 2). Approximately, 40 percent of committee members are women in 
Helpage and Proximity VOs, and a quorum can be achieved at meetings only if the same percent of 
attendees are women. VOs have also become mediums of targeting and uplifting historically 
marginalized segments within the villages, a special focus is given to providing poorest of the poor 
access to information, resources and assets. For example, Proximity’s ‘cash for work’ activities have 
targeted vulnerable, landless, and low income households in need of wage labor opportunities. The 
wage rate for CfW are set by the CBOs but made slightly lower than the prevailing market rate. By 
setting the wage rate lower, the wage rate itself induces the landless and vulnerable households to 
participate and does not attract those who may have better wage options. In places, where all 
households in villages needed immediate wage employment, CBOs have rationed out demand by 
household, ensuring that there is a cap for laborers per household (FGD-Proximity, 2013). 
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Mainstreaming gender equity and social inclusion within VOs, however, has been a demanding task 
for all I/NGOs. “It requires perseverance to ask a patriarchal society to create an organization, 
which is gender balanced and socially inclusive (Kreuscher, 2013).  
Challenges  
In spite of good intentions, the poor and vulnerable are also losing out. In Helpage supported VDCs, 
drop-out of members due to migration has been a major challenge. Most of the villages in Myanmar 
still depend on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods and the poorest of them, e.g. landless, 
also migrate to cities for seasonal income. The drop outs are usually from the poor households and 
the continuing trend of drop-out is creating opposition from villagers against inclusion of poor and 
vulnerable into the VDC executive membership. Similarly, Pact MFCs disburse loans, which require 
paybacks in 25 biweekly installments. When microcredit groups have mobile workers and 
migrants, MFCs cannot collect interest on time. To offset such risk, Pact obliges solitary microcredit 
groups to pay for its non-complying members, which has created conflict within the members. 
Currently, MFCs are advocating revising loan eligibility criteria, which requires borrowers to be 
permanent residents in the villages. Doing so will however miss out on the poorest of the poor in 
the villages. VOs also seem to have increased workload for the vulnerable groups. Particularly, 
monitoring reports of Thadar, Helpage and MCS reflected that the ambition of I/NGOs for the VOs, 
at times, had been very ambitious. In case of Thadar, VDCs members had to spend at least two 
hours every day for a minimum of one and half months to create the ‘village book’. For the poorer 
villagers, who work pro-bono, although the process and vision of VDC would help develop their 
villages, attendance rates were dropping out. “We have to come up with a better incentive than 
seeking voluntary participation from poorer members (FGD-TC, 2013)”. 
5.3.4 Increased social capital  
All FGDs and interviews stressed that villages with VOs have increased confidence and capacity to 
deal with local authorities, development organizations and voice their concerns. Almost all IPs 
report their VOs as hands-on and very participatory approach. I/NGOs report that mobilizing VOs 
has led to even greater cohesion and integration of communities within villages. By ‘bonding social 
capital’ (Gilchrist & Taylor, 2011, p. 91) VOs have associated communities to be involved in wider 
initiatives such as village level development planning. All the VOs allow their members, and 
ultimately target beneficiaries, to openly discuss problems, issues challenges and opportunities. 
Villagers, members of VOs, get involved in situation analysis, problem solving and decision-making. 
While ‘bonding social capital’ derives from this strong relationship between members of VOs in 
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similar situations and helps them getting by in the project activities, VOs mobilized by Metta, 
Thadar, Proximity and Helpage has also generated ‘bridging and linking social capital’ (ibid), which 
helps villagers in getting ahead. Bridging and linking social capital are requisites to influence 
beyond the project target group and communities, to connect with allies and connect outside the VO 
boundaries with other organizations or power holders (ibid: pp. 47-49).  Except for MCS and Pact, 
all respondent I/NGOs have a strong practice to promote connection of their VOs with different 
levels of power, service users and providers, for example with government  departments.  Doing so 
villagers have developed useful negotiation skills, which they now use to protect their rights and 
advocate for others. VO members also have confidence to speak up in public and networking with 
other villagers. Interactions and exposure with wide array of stakeholders has allowed VO 
members to be articulate about their project activities, demand new activities with local 
government and other INGOs, all of which was completely unimaginable prior to the formation of 
these VOs (FGD-Proximity, 2013). 
“Land confiscation has always been a conflicting issue in Myanmar, but villagers previously did 
not dare to speak about it publicly. With the platform provided by VDCs, people are now 
openly discussing and negotiating with village authorities to protect their tenure rights and 
ensure land ownerships (Consortium, 2012)”.  
“During military regime, only one person (a village tycoon) had slaughter license to kill 
animals in the villages. People had to pay the tycoon to kill their animals. Through VDCs, 
villages in Sagaing and Manadalay have negotiated with the village authorities and now can 
freely kill their own animals (FGD-HI, 2013).” 
Among many other things, mobilizing VOs has led to rise of increased social capital and cohesion in 
the villages. It has also opened up a shared platform and access to government departments for 
common villagers. Traditionally village leaders have spent development budget on their own 
discretion, which usually resulted in grievances and dissatisfaction of villagers (Jaiswal, 2013). 
Today, action plans (e.g. ICAP and village book) created by VOs, present a thorough analysis of 
problems, needs, solutions and collectively agreed activities. These action plans are proving to be a 
sound basis for village authorities to spend their development budget. On one hand VOs have built 
their capacities to demand services from government and collectively bargain their rights, on other 
authorities are updated about the situation and needs of villagers helping them make their services 
responsive and effective.  
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“In Sagaing, officials from government department of animal vaccination are responding to 
VDC requests to vaccinate animals in all 15 villagers. Earlier vaccinators visited villages on 
sporadic basis and did not cover all the livestock owners. Having a VDC has enabled all the 
villagers to collectively approach government agencies for extension services, mutually agree 
on a vaccination date and time, and cover the whole village (FGD-HI, 2013).”  
In overall, data from FGDs suggest that VOs are providing a much needed backstopping to 
government authorities for village level development. A proper collaboration between village 
authorities and VOs, thus, present a new nexus for government and international agencies in 
realizing participatory development in Myanmar (Kreuscher, 2013). 
5.3.5 VO overlap and membership cross overs 
Organizational overlaps, amongst VOs and I/NGO projects are all but, inevitable. However, 
overlapping of VOs is also the single biggest challenge for participatory development (Hickey & 
Mohan, 2004). Pact FGD participants inform of common situations, where villagers have 
overlapping loan from other non-pact programs. This has complicated repayments from 
beneficiaries. Coordination between microfinance groups within villages is missing, let alone 
between INGOs financial services. Technically, at least I/NGOs with microfinance program should 
share their baseline and client data in every village, but this is far from reality in most of Pact 
project villages (FGD-Pact, 2013). Pact FGD participants raised concern that some people in the 
villages end up getting loans from many VOs, while the poorest and who are in the most need could 
be left out in such scenario.  
In the interim, there is also a big demand for literate people and community leaders from different 
INGO projects (Jaiswal, 2013). In many remote villages there is handful of educated persons; VOs of 
different projects sometimes have to rely on the same persons, at least during the project inception 
(Monitoring_visit_HI, 2011). Power is concentrating on few persons. 
 “Simply put, there cannot be abundance of leaders in one small village, but all projects are 
creating their own village organizations. All the community leaders in our project villages are 
overwhelmed by different NGOs (FGD-HI, 2013)”.  
Another example comes for Thadar- Treasurers and accountants of some VDCs have to manage 
revolving funds from more than two I/NGOs. These VDC members have to keep separate 
bookkeeping records for each organization and are overburdened with work, which they perform 
voluntarily. Though I/NGOs in some villages have coordinated their project activities through one 
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VDC, they continue to keep separate sub-committees for their individual projects. This has 
increased workload for VDC executive committees, who are now refusing new revolving funds from 
other INGOs. Ei Ei Khine, community facilitator for Thadar’s project in Delta, gave an example of 
some VDCs that have decided to not accept any new funding when they reach a threshold of 6 
million kyats, about USD 6000 (FGD-TC, 2013).  
6 Conclusion 
6.1 Why village organizations? 
By now it is clear that development agencies in Myanmar are promoting village organizations for 
variegated reasons. There is an immense promise behind setting the VOs, exhilaration of 
exploration and inducing participatory development at the grassroots. This phenomenon can be 
seen in a national context- it represents a process of Myanmar’s political and economic evolution. 
Although the precise magnitude is difficult to estimate, VOs in Myanmar can be concluded as a 
donor and INGO led process. What is interesting though is that the configuration, autonomy and 
governance practices within the VOs have been directly affected by the control from the Burmese 
state. Majority of the VOs questioned under this research have been set up only after the political 
reforms in late 2010, however, local NGOs like Metta and MCS have longer history of working with 
VOs, and Thadar in response of the Cyclone Nargis. For local NGOs, this has been possible largely 
because of their non-confrontation with Myanmar’s old political setup and most importantly due to 
their VO’s sole focus on instrumental ends- delivering project services and transferring knowledge, 
credit and technology to the beneficiaries than challenging the power structures at local level.  
In general, motivation of international and local NGOs for creating VOs are reactive and 
opportunistic than proactive; all the sample I/NGOs have established VOs in response to the 
government’s development strategy and gradual opening of development space in Myanmar. 
Decentralization appears to be a major sticky point for this- the government is relaxing its grip on 
villages, has allowed plurality and autonomy of village organizations and accepted public 
engagement and democratic governance at the grassroots. As declared by EC (2013, p. 13), support 
to VOs from development agencies are envisaged by the host government’s political will to initiate 
and/or where decentralization reforms are already put in place. I/NGOs are riding this wave of 
Burmese reforms and decentralizing their own project structures at rural level. Whereas some 
INGOs like Proximity and Helpage reason their distrust and lack of confidence in the government 
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and traditional organizations for creating new autonomous VOs, this is an expression of political 
renewal of Myanmar.  
On the other hand, proliferation of VOs in Myanmar also shows manifestations of economic 
liberalization as witnessed in other developing countries through 1990s. MCS, Proximity and Pact’s 
reasoning for VOs stem from unwavering faith on market as the solution to poverty reduction and 
development of Myanmar. VOs are created by these I/NGOs to be micro institutions of economic 
progress, pitched with government’s gospel of villages as ‘engines of economic growth’. The 
philosophy behind conception of these VOs is to create a platform of private capital accumulation at 
local level, which recognize the poor villagers’ ability to participate in economic growth (Collion & 
Rondot, 1998), giving them access to credit and requiring them to invest. These market-oriented 
VOs are proliferating based on I/NGOs pro-poor growth strategy, which generates organizations of 
the poor as subjects in economic liberalization (Wignaraja, 2005, p.1165).  
In overall, two strong working conclusions appear as basic and likely to last. They are that:  
 The major motivation of I/NGOs for creating and mobilizing VOs is project driven. VOs are 
channels to deliver aid and implement projects efficiently. More so the case for all three local 
NGOs; VOs are an extension of their organizational structure at the village level. The local 
NGOs are using their VOs for single-purpose standalone project activities. Thadar initially 
created its VO for delivering relief work, and even though, it has metamorphosed to a VDC 
with scope over the whole village, the intent has been to execute project activities through 
sub-committees. 
 For all three INGOs, however, empowerment of end beneficiaries appears as the driving 
force. Helpage wants its VDCs to be the focal point for rural development and enable 
villagers to create their own development priorities, while Pact and Proximity envision their 
beneficiaries to utilize their accessed capital under their own discretion. Empowerment of 
villagers seems to be integral for the INGOs than NGOs. Participation of villagers in decision 
making processes and access to accountability mechanisms provide a strong incentive on 
why internationals are creating VOs. 
6.2 What has been the effect? 
Although the precise magnitude is difficult to estimate, village organizations are having an 
astounding effect on rural development of Myanmar. They represent a stage in a process of socio-
political reforms in Myanmar. The lessons are convincing but cannot be final, maybe in five or ten 
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years’ time more will have been learnt and the findings reported now will be qualified and added by 
further experience. Findings from the research demonstrate village organizations as a broad based, 
holistic approach that starts with people’s own concern, which supports public participation and 
local solutions. VOs have a role in supporting communities to run their own services and public 
spaces and in exploring new forms of co-operation with local stakeholders (Hickey & Mohan, 2004). 
Most of the VOs have created a boundary spanning role, working with decision makers at the 
grassroots to make services work with and for local people. A major achievement has been to 
promote equality and diversity within the VOs; needs of individuals and usually neglected 
vulnerable groups like women and the poorest of poor are being heard for the first time in a village 
level action planning. Similarly, power over development works are being shared amongst different 
VOs and this has given rise to plurality of development actors at the village level. Meanwhile, 
participatory planning processes and consensus building has led to an increased social capital in 
the villages. While market oriented VOs like MFC and SRGs are ‘getting by’ with project activities, 
wider community oriented VOs like VDCs, CBOs and FFSs are ‘getting ahead’ of their boundaries 
and interacting with other power holders as well. This ‘bonding and linking capital’ (Gilchrist & 
Taylor, 2011) of VOs has resulted in stronger collaboration between village authorities and 
villagers, which presents a new government-civil society nexus in promoting participatory 
development in Myanmar.  
VOs are creating exciting new opportunities, but like most magic bullets, they have their own 
pitfalls. The organizations claim to tackle the causes of major social problem, but often become 
mired in dealing with the symptoms rather than challenging the power structures that keep people 
improvised. Interference from village authorities and influential leaders over VOs appear to be a 
pertinent challenge facing all villages. This however, warrants a contextual understanding of 
Myanmar’s past and that disempowerment of village authorities and powerful elites requires a 
closer attention from all development agencies. As the findings suggest VOs are also frequented by 
micro-management from host I/NGOs to larger extent. Transfer of autonomy and control to the VOs 
over development is carefully deliberated and the needs of local people are shaped by perception of 
what the project agency could actually offer. At present, it appears that VOs, and participation 
exercises within, has only amounted to little more than ‘tokenism’ (Arnstein, 1969). Most of the 
sample organizations stress primarily on ‘informing’ their beneficiaries about project activities, 
which is a one way flow of information about what will be done in the villages. Handfuls of them, 
nonetheless, organize a village level consultation meeting, but the findings suggest that this is 
particularly aimed to achieve popular consent through public relations. Power over planning and 
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decision making is in fact redistributed through negotiation between VO members and power 
holders, like project staff and village authorities, but there are also valid concerns of ‘placation’ 
(ibid), for example co-option of hand-picked ‘worthies’ onto VO memberships. In overall, a project 
society has been developed in the villages than a civil society. Development agencies are in essence 
‘delivering’ a model based on their project activity, and it is still long time before villagers handle 
the entire job of planning, policy making and managing the development that happens in their 
villages. 
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8 Appendices 
8.1 Appendix- I: List of participants (FGDs and Interviews) 
Focus Group Discussions 
a) Helpage International:  
Aye Aye Nyein (Director), Thein Thein Aung (M&E Officer), Maung Nay Lynn Aung 
(Communication Officer), Win Shwe Maung (Senior Project Manager). 
On 17/12/2013. 
b) Metta Development Foundation:  
Khin Maung Latt (Project Coordinator), Aung Myo Mon (Technical Specialist), Khun Maung Khae 
(M&E Officer). 
On 06/01/2014 
c) Myanmar Ceramic Society:  
Dr Myo Thant Tyn (President), Daw Sandar Kyaw (Project Manager), U Kis Pa Na De Zaw 
(Project Coordinator), Wai Lin (Project Coordinator).  
On 18/12/2013. 
d) Pact Myanmar:  
Khin Than Yin (ACBC member), So Lu Kyaw (Project Manager- Swanyee), Yee Mon (Project 
Manager-Ratana), Naw Ester (Fellow-YKBWA), Salai Aung Kyaw (Fellow-ECLOF), Aye Aye Thaw 
(Project Officer), U Thaw Thaw Lwin (Project Officer-ECLOF) and Saw Mar Thaw Gyi (M&E 
Coordinator). 
 On 19/12/2013. 
e) Proximity Design:  
Lai Win Phyu (Donor Relations Associate), Khin Maung Htay (Program Manager), Thein Ohn 
(former BoD, Microfinance Consultant), Aung Kyaw Thu (Project coordinator). 
On 19/12/2013. 
f) Thadar Consortium:   
Tun Yu (Senior Project Officer), Saw Naing Win (Project Manager), Kinsanar Soe (Finance 
Officer), Ei Ei Khine (Fellow- MBCU II), Kyaw Min Thu (Fellow- MBCU), Naung Zin Latt (Project 
Manager, Social Vision Services). 
On 17/12/2013.  
Semi-structered Interviews 
a) George Collet (M&E Officer), Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund. On 20/12/2013. 
b) Harald Kreuscher (Programme Officer), Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund. On 
16/12/2013. 
c) Nay Tun (Delta Coordinator), Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund. On 14/12/2013. 
d) Nawtin Thetsan (Program officer), Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund. On 17/12/2013.  
e) Jitendra Jaiswal (Livelihood and Recovery Expert), United Nations Development Programme. On 
21/12/2013.  
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8.2 Appendix-II: Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund  
(Original document copied from UNOPS- Myanmar website, accessed on 17/05/2014, available at: 
http://www.unops.org/english/whatwedo/Locations/Europe/Myanmar-Operations-
Centre/Pages/MyanmarOperationsCentre.aspx) 
In 2008, a group of donors began discussing ways to help Myanmar make faster progress towards 
achieving Millennium Development Goal 1, the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger. After 
extensive consultations with key stakeholders from governments, embassies, the United Nations 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the Livelihoods and Food Security Trust Fund (LIFT) 
was launched. 
Initial contributions for LIFT’s work came from Australia, the European Union (EU), the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. More recent contributors are from 
Denmark, New Zealand, France and the United States of America. UNOPS was contracted as the 
fund manager to administer the funds and provide monitoring and oversight for LIFT. 
LIFT’s vision is to be an effective mechanism for channeling aid to partners to achieve its goal of 
improving the food and livelihood security of the poor and vulnerable in Myanmar. LIFT also aims 
to be a collective and influential voice promoting programme coherence, financial inclusion, 
learning and innovation, and provide a platform for enhanced policy engagement on agriculture, 
food security, and rural development in Myanmar. LIFT is expected to continue its operations until 
the end of 2016. 
LIFT is active in the Ayeyarwaddy Delta in lower Myanmar, the Dry Zone in upper Myanmar, as well 
as Shan State, Chin State, Kachin State and Rakhine State. To date, the programme has assisted 1.5 
million people, or more than 3 percent of Myanmar’s estimated population of 54 million, and 
reached some of the poorest and most vulnerable rural families. 
